We set up a general framework for higher order probabilities. A simple HOP (Higher Order Probability space) consists of a probability space and an operation PR, such that, for every event A and every real closed interval zL PR(A ,A) is the event that A's "true" probability lies in A. (The 'true" probability can be construed here either as the objective probability, or the probability assigned by an expert, or the one assigned eventually in a fuller state of knowledge.) In a general HOP the operation PR has also an additional argument ranging over an ordered set of time-points, or, more generally, over a partially ordered set of stages; PR (A,t,z~) is the event that A's probability at stage t lies in A. First we investigate simple HOPs and then the general ones. Assuming some intuitively justified axioms, we derive the most general structure of such a space. We also indicate various connections with modal logic.
Introduction
The assignment of probabilties is the most established way of measuring uncertainties on a quantitative scale, in the framework of subjective probability, the probabilities are interpreted as someone's (the agent,'s) degrees of belief. Since justified belief amounts to knowledge, the assignment of probabilities, in as much as it can be justified, expresses knowledge. Indeed, knowledge of probabilities, appears to be the basic kind of knowledge that is provided by the experimental sciences today. This is knowledge of a partial, or incomplete, nature, but not in the usual sense of ~partial'. Usually we mean by 'partial knowledge ~ knowledge of some, but not all, of the facts in a certain domain. [~ut knowing that a given coin is unbiased does not enable one to deduce any non-tautological Boolean combination of propositions which describe outcomes in the next, say fifty tosses. And yet it constitutes very valuable knowledge about these very same outcomes. What is the objective content of this knowledge ? What kind of fact is the fact that the true probability of mheads" is 0.5, i.e., that the coin is / unbiased ? I shall not enter here into these classical problems 2. | take it for granted that, among probability assignments, some are more successful, or better tuned to the actual world, than others.
Consequently probability assignments are themselves subject to judgement and evaluation. Having,for example, to estimate the possibility of rain I might give it, going by the sky's appearance, 700~. But I shall be highly uncertain about my estimate and will adopt the different value given, five minutes later, in the weather forecast.
Thus we have two levels of uncertainty:
1. Uncertainty concerning the occurence of a certain event -expressed through the assignment of probabilities.
2. Uncertainty concerning the probability values assigned in 1.
2My Salzburg paper {If~83] has been devoted to these questions. The upshot of the analysls there has been that even a "purdy subjective n probability implies a kind of factual claim, for one can ~sses it8 success in the actual world, Rather than t w o different kinds, subjective and objective probabflties are better to be regarded as two extremes of a spectrum.
When this second level is itself expressed by assigning probabilities we get second order probabilities.
An example of a second order probability is furnished by a cartoon in aThe New Yorker" showing a forecaster making the following announcement:
"There is nvw 60~ chance of rain tomorrow, but, there is 70% chance that later this evening the chance of rain tomorrow will be 80~. m Just as we can iterate modal or epistemic operators, so in the system to be presented here we can iterate the probability-assignment operator to any depth. The goal of this paper is to present a general and adequate semantics for higher order probabilities and to obtain, via representaton theorems, nice easily understood structures which give us a handle on the situation.
The basic structure to be defined here is a HOP (Higher Order Probability space). A simple HOP is based on a field of events, F, and on a binary operator PR( , ) which associates with every event A and every real closed interval A an event PR(A,,~) in F. The intended meaning is that PR(A,A) is the event that A's true probability lies in the interval A.
"True probability" can be understood here as the probability assigned by an ideal expert or by someone fully informed. It is however up to us (or to the agent} to decide what in the given context constitutes an "ideal expert" or "someone fully informed:.: If 'full information" means knowing all the facts then, of course, the true (unknown to us) probability has only two values 0 and 1; this will make the HOP trivial in a certain sense. In the other extreme, the agent may regard himself as being already fully informed and this leads to the "opposite" trivialization of the HOP. Generally, the agent will regard the expert as being more knowledgeable than himself, but not omniscient; e.g., the expert might know the true bias of a coin but not the outcomes of future tossings, or he might have statistical information for estimating the bias, which the agent lacks.
The agent himself at some future time can be cast in the role of being 'fully informed'. Thus, if P is the forecaster's present probability function and if PR represents his state of knowledge later in the evening, then his announcement in "The New Yorker' cartoon can be summed up as follows, where A = 'tomorrow it will rain': P(A) =.6 P(PR(A , [.8, In order to represent knowledge at different stages, we make PR into a 3-place operator:
PR(At t t Zi)
is the event that the probability of A at stage t lies in A~ The stages can be time-points, in which case t ranges over sortie ordered set. More generally, the set of stages is only partially ordered, where, < t if the knowledge at stage t includes the knowledge at stage s. (Different agents may thus be represented in the structure.) This is how a HOP is defined in general. We shall first establish the properties of simple HOPs, then use them to derive those of the more general spaces.
We shall also define, in a seperate section, a formal logical calculus, to be called probability logi¢, which is naturally associated with simple HOPs. Various modalities can be reconstructed within this calculus. The general HOPs give rise to stage-dependent modalities whose calculus will be outlined at the end of the paper.
The import of the subject for various branches of philosophy and for the foundations of probability is obvious. Also obvious should be its bearing upon applied probabilistic reasoning in distributed networks, or upon efbrts to incorporate such reasoning in AI systems. Mathematically, most of this paper is rather easy. Our goal has not been to prove difficult theorems, but to clarify some basic concepts and to outline a general, conceptually "clean', framework within which one can use freely and to good effect statements such as: 'With probability 0.7 Adam will know at stage 3 Bob's probability for the event A, with error 0.01' (where Adam and Bob are either people or processors). Statements of this form express intuitive thinking which may underly involved technical proofs; to use them openly and precisely can help us as a guide for finding and organizing our arguments.
A theoretic framework for higher order probabilities may also yield insights into systems of reasoning which employ non-probabilistic certainty measures. For when probability is itself treated like a random variable, we can use various methods of %ale" estimation which do not necessarily yield a probability measure. For example, define the certainty measure of an event A to be the largest a such that, with probability 1, the probability of A is > or. This is only one, apparently the most conservative, measure among various measures that can be used.
Higher order probabilities have been considered by De-Finetti, but rejected by him owing to his extreme subjectivist views. Savage considered the possibility but did not take it up, fearing that the higher order probabilities will reflect back on the ground level, leading to inconsistencies. Instances of higher order probabilities figure in works of Good [1965] and Jaynes [1958] . More recent philosophical works are by Demeter [1985] , Gardenfors [1975] (for qualitative probabilities), Miller [1960] , Skyrms [1980 Skyrms [ A], [1980 ] -who did much to clarify matters, van-Frassen [1984] , and others.
Due to limitations of space and deadline I have not entered into details of various proofs. Some of the material has been abridged; I have included some illustrative examples of simple HOPs, but not the more interesting ones of general HOPs (which arise naturally in distributed systems). Also the bibliography is far from complete.
Simple HOPs

Definition and Basic Properties
As in Kolmogoroff's framework [19331 we interpret propositions as subset__.~ of some universal set, say IV, and we refer to them as events. We can regard W as the set of all possible worlds. Thus we have X = set of all worlds in which X is true and we get the following standard correspondence:
Terminology: A Boolean Algebra (of sets) is a class of sets closed under finite unions (and intersections) and under complementation (with respect to some presupposed universal set, in our case -1,tl). A fiel___d is a Boolean algebra closed under countable unions (what is known also as a a-algebra). The field (Boolean algebra) generate d by a class S of sets is the smallest field (Boolean algebra) which contains S as a subclass. Note that in generating a Boolean algebra we apply finitary operations only, whereas in generating a field infinitary countable operations are used. A field is countably generated if it has a countable set of generators. All probabilities are assumed here to be countably additive.
A HOP is a 4-tuple (W, F, P, PR)
, where F is a field of subsets of W, to be called events, P is a probability over F and PR is a mapping associating with every A E F and every real closed interval ,5 an event PR(A,A),
PR : F X set of closed intervals .o, F
As explained in the introduction PR (A,,5) is the event that the true (or the eventual, or the expertassigned) probability of A lies in A. P is the agent's current subjective probability.
Among the closed intervals, we include also the empty interval, 0. The minimal and maximal elements of F are, respectively, 0 and 1; that is: 0 ~. empty subset of W= False, 1 ~. W.~ True.
In the explanations I shall use 'probability" both for the agent's current subjective probability as well as for the true, or eventual one; the contexts indicate the intended reading. 
(A, alOae) ----PR(A,a I) U PR(A,a e) (A's probability lies in
the interval ~l U~2 iff it lies either in A 1 or in A2)
In the follwing two axioms WnW is a running index ranging over {1,£,.. }.
(IV) NnPR(A, zAn) = PR(A, NnAn) (A's probability lies in every `sn iff it lies in their intersecton). Note that axioms (I)-(V) involve only W, F and PR. The crucial axiom which connects PR with P will be stated later.
T H E O R E M 1 For every HOP, H =~ F, P, PR) there is a mapping p which associates with
every x in W a probability, Pz ,over F such that
The mapping p is uniquely determined by (1) and can be defined by:
(2) pJm) = inf{o, : • C r e ( A , [0,o4)} a8 well as by:
Vice verea, if, for every x E W, Pz i8 a probability over F such that {z : pJA) E ,5} is in F for all a E F and all real closed ,5, and if we use (1) as a definition of PR then Azioms (I)-~V) are satisfied.
We call p the kernel of the HOP.
The proof of Theorem 1 is nothing more than a straight.forward derivation of all the required details from the axioms, using (2) as the definition of p . (The =vice versa" part is even more immediate than the first part.)
We can now extend PR and define PR(A,_=), for arbitrary subsets = of reals, as {~ :
The meaning of p~ is obvious: it is the probability which corresponds to the m_ax!n~M state of NotaUo.:
For. e
PR(A, ,)=dr Pn(A,
The picture is considerably simpler in the discrete case, where W is countable. Assuming with no loss of generality that {x} E F for every x E W, the probability of some A C W is simply the sum of the probabilities of the worlds in A. In that case, we can eliminate the closed intervals and consider only the special cases PR(A,a) where ce ranges over [0, 1] ; also our 5 axioms can be replaced by 3 simpler ones.
Discrete cases arise in many situations and are very useful as illustrative examples. But to consider only the discrete case is highly restrictive.
and = dr e({u} ).
In the discrete case P is obviously determined by the values P(x), zEW. Thus, ordering IV, we can represent P as a probability vector (a countable vector of non-negative entries which sum up to 1).
Similarly the kernel p becomes a probab!!t~'.matri x (a countable square matrix in which every row is a probability vector). Examples (i) and (ii) in the Examplel subsection can serve to illustrate the situation (the discussion there presupposes however the next subsection).
Mathematically, what we have got is a Markov process (with initial probability P and transition probabilities p(x, ), zEW). But the interpretation is altogether different from the usual interpretation of such a structure. The connection between P and the kernel p is established in the sixth axiom.
Axiom (VI) And Its Consequences
Let P(AIB ) be the conditional probability of A, given B. It is defined in the case that P
(B) ~ 0 as P(ANB)/P(B).
It is what the agent's probability for A should be had he known B.
Axiom (VIw) If P(PR(A , h, fi])) ~ 0 then a < P(A I PR(A , h,f~]}) < 1~ .
Axiom (VIw) (the weak form of the forthcoming Axiom (VI))is a generalization of Miller's Principle to the case of intervM-based events.
Rewritten in our notation, Miller's Principle is:
P(A [ PR(A,a)) = a.
Axiom (VIw) appears to be the following rule: My probability for A should be no less than a and no more than fi, were I to know that in a more informed state my probability for A will be within these bounds. Plausible as it sounds, the use of the hypothetical "were I to know that.., j needs in this context some clarification. Now a well-known way of explicating conditional probabilties is through conditional bets. In what follows integrating a function f(t) with respect to a probability m is written as ff(t), m(dt).
L e m m a 1
Axiom (VIw) implies that the following holds for all A C F:
P(A) = fp(x,A). P(dx)
The proof consists in applying the formula P(A)=,UcP(A]Bi).P(Bi) , where the Bi's form a partition, passing to the limit and using the definition of an integral.
The implication (3) ~ (VIw) is not true in general. Note that in the discrete case (3) becomes:
which means that the probability vector is an eigen-vector of the kernel. Terminology: A 0-se___A is a set of probability 0. Something is said to hold for almost all z if it holds for all x except for a 0-set. The probability in question is P, unless specified otherwise.
Theorem 2 If F is countably generated then aziora (VI) is equivalent to each of the following conditions:
(A) 
p=(A) ----]py(A)" pz(dy)
The proof that axiom (VI) is equivalent to (A) and implies (B) uses only basic measure theory. The present proof of (B) =~ (A) relies on advanced ergodie theory 4 and I do not know if this can be avoided.
Fortunately the rest of this paper does not rely on this implication (except the corresponding implication in Theorem 3). Note that in the discrete case (4) is equivalent to:
(4d)
p(x,Z)-~-~yp(x,y)'p(y~Z)
(4d) means that the kernel, as a matrix, is equal to its square. 
P(A) = S d'JA)" m(d )
The first equality in (C) is a recasting of (3); it can be equivalently described by saying that P is a mixture of the Pu's with weight function m. Altogether (C) means that we have here what is known as the disintegration of the prob:~bility space. It makes for a rather transparent structure.
For W-countable the disintegration means the following: After deleting from the kernel-matrix rows and columns which correspond to some set of probability 0, the rest decomposes into submatrices around / the main diagonal in each of which all rows are equal, with O's in all other places; P itself is a mixture of these rows. Such HOPs are exactly those that can be constructed as follows (hence this is the method for setting up higher order probabilities which avoid a Dutch book):
• Chose a partition {E : uCU} of W into non-empty disjoint sets, with different u '8 marking different eets.
• Chose for each u in U a probability~ Pu' on W such that Pu(Eu) = I for all u E U', where U' is 8ome non-empty eusbset of U.
• Chose a probability, m, on U such that m(U~=,l, and let P be the mizture of the Pu's with weight function m.
• For each u E U and each x E E u put p$ ffi Pu and define PR(A,~)to be {z: pz(A)Ea}.
The construction is essentially the same for a general W (with a countably generated F}; some additional stipulations of measurability should be included in order to make possible the formation of the mixture and to ensure that the PR(A,~A)'s are in F.
Definlt|on
Call Pu and its corresponding equivalence class, Eu, ontologica_ ~ if Pu(/~) ~-1, call it and its corresponding class coherent if P is a mixture of ontological /~'s. Call a world ontol~ (coherent) if it belongs to an ontological (coherent) equivalence class.
An ontological class is of course coherent. A coherent class which is not ontological must get the value 0 under its own Pu" It represents a state of knowledge in which the agent knows for sure that his eventual probability function will be different from his current one (and that it will be an ontological one).
The set of ontological worlds gets the value 1 under P and under each p~ where z is coherent. It is The agent's current probability assigns each world the value 1/3. Eventually, in world wl he will know that he is not in w3 and he will assign each of the worlds wl, wg the value 0.5. This is the meaning of the first row. The other rows are similarly interpreted. where all undisplayed entries are 0. The sets {wl,we, w8}, {w$,w5} and {w6} are equivalence classes which are ontological. P is a mixture of these 3 types of rows, with weights 0.5, 0.5, 0, respectively. Hence condition (C) is satisfied, therefore also Axiom (VI). w7 is a coherent non-ontological world, because the 7th row is a mixture of the first three types (with weights .25, .25, .5) w8 is not coherent. The ontological part consists of the upper left 6 X 6 matrix and the coherent part of the 7 X 7 one.
The example can be made more concrete by the following scenario. A number is to be chosen from {1,2,8}. For i=1,2,3, the number chosen in wi is i, but in each of these 3 worlds the maximal knowledge consists in assigning probabilities 0.2, 0.4, 0.4 to the 3 possibilities. In w$ the number chosen is I and in w5 it is 2; in either of these worlds the maximal knowledge consists in assigning the probabilities 0.2, 0.8.
In w6 the number is 2 and it is also assigned probability 1. In the agent's current state he assigns probability 0 to finding himself eventually in the third state of maximal knowledge, and equal probabilities to the first and second states. World w7 represent a similar situation but with different weights. We can imagine 3 lotteries for ehosing the number; in each equivalence class the maximal knowledge is knowledge of the chosen lottery. E x a m p l e 3: Let H be the probability of 'heads u of some given coin of unknown bias. Treat H as a random variable. The agent's knowledge is represented by a probability distribution for H. Say it is the uniform distribution over [0, 1] . The expert does not know the value of H but he has some additional information. Say his additional information is the value of N -the number of Uheadsm in 50 independent tosses. Then our worlds can be regarded as pairs (h,n) , such that in (h,n) the event H-~hNN=n is true;
here h is a real number in [0, 1] and n an integer between 0 and 50. The field F is generated by the sets
Given H=h, we get the binomial distribution bh,5o for N. This fact, together with the agent's uniform distribution for H, determines his probability P over F. The expert's probability in world (h,n) is obtained by conditioning on his information, it is P(IN=n). There are 51 equivalence classes which correspond to the 51 possible values of N and all worlds are ontological.
As is well known, different values of N give rise to different conditional distributions of H. Therefore the events N=n are in the field generated by the events s PR(HE [o~,t~] , .,!l). The whole field F is therefore generated by events which are either of the form HE [a,t~] or obtained from these by applying the operator PR. Consequently we can give an abstract description of this HOP which does not mention the fifty tosses. The only function of the tosses is to affect the distribution of H; in our framework such changes in distribution constitute themselves events which can be treated directly, without having to bring in their causes.
The Case of a General Field
The restriction that F be countably generated is a mild one. The probability spaces which commonly appear in theory, or in applications, are essntially of this nature 6. Usually we are interested in properties that involve only countably many generators. We will first show that for studying such properties we can always restrict ourselves to the case where the underlying field is countably generated. HIS], together with the restrictions of P and PR to it, forms a subHOP, where this notion is defined in the obvious way.
Lemma 3 If S i~ a Boolean algebra and, for every A in S and every rational closed interval ~, PR(A,A) is in S, then HIS] is the field generated by S.
This means that, once we have a Boolean algebra closed under PR(,A) for all A with rational endpoints, we get all the rest by countable Boolean operations without using PR.
Corollary If S is either countable, or a countably generated field, then HIS] i8 countably generated.
5Actually there are 51 real numbers @n such that the event Nffiffin is the same as PR [H~I/P, Crn). 6They are seperable, i.e., for some countably generated field every event in the space differs from a set in the field by a 0-set. Assuming Axiom (VI) we get: Hence, for all A, PR(C,d) is equal a.e. to one of: C, W-C, W, ~. Since KFFK [S] ] is generated by such sets, the claim follows.) Roughly speaking, (ii) means that, modulo 0-sets, nested applications of PR reduce to non-nested applications. A stronger, syntactical version of this is given in the next section.
Corollary If scF, then: (i) The yield8 KIS], KIKfS]] and K[H[SI] are equal modulo O-sets. (ii) If S is a boolean algebra then HIS] ie equal modulo O-sets to the field generated by S U K[S].
Probability Logic
Let S be a set of reals such that 0,1 E •. Call an interval with end-points in ~ a ~-int~wal. Call ~ a PC-formula if it is a wff of the propositional calculus, i.e., does not contain any PR.
Theorem 4 Every wff of P R L j ie p-equivalent to a Boolean combination of PC-formulas and formulae of the form PR(a, Zl) in which a rangeo over PC-formulae.
This means that as far as probabilities are concerned (i.e., if we disregard O-sets) we need not use nested PEs. 
General HOPs
In general, a HOP is a stucture of the form: (W, F, P, T, PR) where, as before, ~ F, P) is a probability space, T == (T, <') is a partially ordered set and where (A,t,A) is the event that the probability of A at stage t lies in A. If the stages coincide with time points then the partial ordering of T is total. As before, P is the current subjective probability; here
PR : F X T X set of closed intervals ~ F PR
• current" is earlier (i.e., less than or equally informative) than the stages in T. Put:
PRt(A'A ) =dr PR(A,t,A )
The first five axioms (I*) -(V*) in this setting are the obvious generalizations of our previous axioms (I) -(V). Namely, we replace 'PR' by 'PR t and require that the condition hold for all t in T.
Theorem 1 generalizes in the obvious way and we get, for each t E T and each z E W, a probability Pt,z which detemrines Pitt; it represents the maximal state of knowledge at stage t in worlds _.
The "correct" generalization of Axiom (VI) is not as obvious, but is not difficult to find:
Axiom (VI*) For each lET the following holds: If C is a finite intersection of events of the form PRs(B,A ) where every s is ~ t, and P(C n VRt(a,la, l~]) ) # O, then a _< P(AIUnPRJA,Ia, B])) <_ B
The argument for this axiom is the same as the argument for Axiom (Vl). The essential point is that if s < t then true events of the form PRe(13,A ) are known at stage t. The same Dutch book argument works for Axiom (VI*).
As before, we consider fields generated by knowable events and define epistemie equivalence; but now these concepts depend on the stage parameter, to be displayed here as an additional subscript. (Vl) .
For each t E T the simple HOP ~ F, P, PR t ) satisfies Axiom
and (E)
For each s ~ t, z~ty =~ z~ey, for almost all z,~l (i.e., for all Z,~l E W' where P(W~ •, I) .
(E) means that, as we pass to more progressive stages, almost everywhere epistemi¢ equivalence is the same or becomes stronger; the partition into equivalence cla~ses can change only by becoming more refined.
Like Theorem 2 the last theorem has a version that applies to general fields but I shall not enter here into it. In the following theorem F is assumed to be countably generated. Fix a partially ordered set T ----{T, <'). The logic PRL~. r (which corresponds to HOPs with set of stages T) is defined in the same way as PRLt/, except that PR has an additional argument ranging over T.
As before we employ a systematically ambiguous notation. Define ~ to be p-valid if it gets probability I in all HOPs in which the set of stages is T.
Now consider a propositional modal language, M T , in which we have, instead of a single necessity operant, an indexed family N e t E T. Nt~ states that ~ is necessary at stage t, i.e., necessary, by virtue of the maximal knowledge available at that stage.
For ~EM T , let ~* be the wff obtained by replacing each Nt~ by PRJ~, [i,I] ). It can be shown that the set of all ~ in M T such that ~* is p-valid is exactly the set of wffs derirvable, by modus ponens and the rule: if I"~ then l---Nt~b, from the following axioms:
(i) All tautologies.
(ii) For each t E T, the axiom schemas of 85, with N replaced by Nt, and
(iii)
Ns¢~ --. Nt~, for each s _< t.
Note that (iii) accords well with the intended meaning of the Nt's: If something is necessary at stage s it is also nesessary at later stages. On the other hand, something not necessary at stage s can be necessary later.
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